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Abstract
In this article we address the question of whether the perceived level of corruption
in a country may influence women’s inclination in self-refraining from applying for
bank loans. Using a sample of 60,058 observations—drawn from the European
Central Bank- Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (ECB-SAFE)—related
to small- and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs) chartered in 11 Euro-area countries
during the period 2009–2014, we first investigate whether female-led businesses are
more likely, than male-led ones, to refrain from applying for bank credit. Finally, we
assess whether corruption actually matters in the women’s decision not to relying
on the bank-lending channel. Our results—robust to various model specifications—
highlight that women-led SMEs face a higher probability to self-refrain from apply-
ing for loans vis-a`-vis their male counterparts. In addition, although corruption ap-
pears strongly correlated to the self-restraint attitudes of firms, our empirical ana-
lysis reveals that women-led SMEs generally tend to refrain from applying for loans,
more than men, regardless of the quality of the surrounding environment. (JEL
codes: G20, G30, G32, J16)
Key words: demand for bank credit, SMEs, gender, corruption
1. Introduction
Corruption is an important dimension of the quality of institutions. In reducing the level of
trust, corruption makes economic transactions more costly and inefficient and, consequently,
affects social development and economic growth.1 The level of corruption is generally
1 For a recent survey, see Dimant and Tosato (2017).
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2different in industrialized, emerging, and developing countries. However, the picture of the
gravity of the phenomenon is quite diversified also in the euro area, where Greece and Italy
appear as the most corrupt economies, while Finland and The Netherlands as the least cor-
rupt ones.2 At aggregate level, data highlight that countries characterized by greater degrees
of corruption are also those where the gender gap is higher. If we look at the worldwide data
on gender gap,3 significant gender inequalities—especially in economic participation and pol-
itical empowerment—emerge even across European countries. Moreover, the individual-level
data—such as the ones provided by the survey of the Global Barometer of Corruption
(Transparency International, various years)—show that women, on average, are less likely to
engage in corrupt activities than men (Wa¨ngnerud 2012; Agerberg 2014).
An interesting bulk of the literature has investigated the impact that institutional factors
may have on the credit market. Notably, evidence shows that the efficiency of institutions,
the enforcement of legal rights—namely, creditor rights protection and judicial enforcement
(La Porta et al. 1997; Qian and Strahan 2007; Djankov et al. 2008; Moro et al. 2016; Galli
et al. 2017a)—and the competitiveness of the banking market (Cavalluzzo et al. 2002) af-
fect the behaviour of SMEs in regard to their propensity to apply for loans. However, little
research has been done, so far, to investigate the effects that corruption may exert on the in-
clination of firms to access bank credit (Galli et al. 2017b).
Another strand of the literature has widely debated, with regard to a variety of countries,
whether gender disparities arise in the bank–firm relationship—provided that the access con-
ditions to bank credit play a decisive role in the survival and development of female-led
SMEs (see, among others, Brush et al. 2001; Marlow and Patton 2005; World Bank 2011;
Aristei and Gallo 2016). The well-known problems faced in general by the SMEs, in entering
equity markets (Ayadi and Gadi 2013; Kremp and Sevestre 2013; Vermoesen et al. 2013) and
in producing high-quality collaterals (Vos et al. 2007; O¨ztu¨rk and Mrkaic 2014), have not
surely helped firms during the recent financial crisis when the difficulties in the access to bank
credit further sharpened. This is particularly evident if we look at the latest data from the
Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE). As a matter of fact, during the past
years in Europe female-led firms, on average, have resorted less frequently to bank loans than
their male counterparts—30 and 37%, respectively (SAFE, various years).
Interestingly, several contributions have shown that, on the demand side, women-led
firms tend to self-refrain from applying for bank credit either because they anticipate a de-
nial from the lender (inter alia, Freel et al. 2012; Moro et al. 2017) or because they own suf-
ficient internal funds or resort to families and other social ties (inter alia, Guiso et al. 2004;
Coleman and Robb 2009; Alesina et al. 2013). Finally, some contributions have focused on
the role played by the level of social capital4 in the functioning of the credit market high-
lighting that a higher level of it may reduce the asymmetric information that characterizes
the credit contract. This, in turn, facilitates the access to bank loans, especially for those,
2 See the Freedom from Corruption Index and the Corruption Perception Index at the following links, re-
spectively: www.heritage.org/index/freedom-from-corruption and www.transparency.it/corruption-
perceptions-index.
3 See the Global Gender Gap Index, by country, at the following link: http://reports.weforum.org/glo
bal-gender-gap-report/rankings/
4 Social capital can be defined as the benefits obtained by individuals as members of a community
or social network. For an illustration of the different dimensions of social capital, see Coleman
(1994) and, more recently, De Blasio et al. (2014).
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3like women-led SMEs, who generally rely on informal financing channels (see, inter alia,
Guiso et al. 2004; Albertazzi and Marchetti 2010; Alesina et al. 2013; Guiso et al. 2013;
Moro and Fink 2013). In this respect, social capital in the credit market supposedly stimu-
lates the opposite mechanisms generated by corruption (Uslaner 2013).
In light of the aforementioned strands of the literature, we argue that corruption may
modify both firms’ expectations about their possibility of being successful in demanding
credit, and the level of trust required in the bank–firm relationship. We expect that this ef-
fect may be even greater for women-led firms, which may face more difficulties in manag-
ing their business and perceive corruption worse than men. All in all, in this article we
investigate whether in a less (more) corrupt environment, women-led SMEs face a lower
(higher) probability to self-refrain from applying to bank credit compared to men-led peers.
Using a sample of 60,058 observations—drawn from the ECB-SAFE—related to SMEs
chartered in 11 Euro-area countries during the period 2009–2014, we first tackle the issue of
gender bias in credit markets by employing multinomial logit models. Secondly, we address
the possible endogeneity affecting the relation between the manager’s gender and the non-
application reasons. This problem may arises because the choice of appointing a female
manager could be driven by unobservable factors, such as a particular corporate culture char-
acterizing the firm (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Liu et al. 2014; Sila et al. 2016; Mascia and
Rossi 2017), rather than being exogenous. Therefore, to solve the potential endogeneity, we
employ a two-step approach with the use of an instrumental variable similarly to Cumming
(2008) and Heger and Tykvova´ (2009). Thirdly, to test our main hypothesis, we introduce an
interaction term between the firm’s gender and corruption, thus to verify whether the sur-
rounding environment affects the female firms’ propensity to demand bank credit.
Our results show that female-led firms behave, more than male-led ones, as discouraged
borrowers in the access to bank credit—as they anticipate a denial from the lender.
Corruption (and conversely social capital) seems to have a negative (positive) impact on the
access to bank credit, provided that firms are less confident about a positive outcome for
their requests when corruption is higher. These findings are robust to various model specifi-
cations and are confirmed even after addressing endogeneity. As regards the link between
the social environment and the enterprise’s gender, we find that corruption does not seem
to drive the behaviour of firms with regard to their propensity to avoid bank loans applica-
tions. This might be due to an intrinsic attitude of women in generally being more risk-
averse and less confident about their entrepreneurial capabilities than men (Booth and
Nolen 2015; Caliendo et al. 2015; Carter et al. 2015; Crosetto et al. 2015).
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we offer a review of two main strands
of the literature. In Section 3, we illustrate the data and the methodology. The empirical re-
sults are discussed in Section 4, whereas Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
2.1 Corruption, credit access, and gender
Corruption5 is an important dimension of the quality of the institutions, as most of the eco-
nomic literature and institutional reports consider it as a major obstacle to social
5 Corruption is defined as the abuse, by a public officer, of his power to obtain a private gain (Rose-
Ackerman 1975).
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4development and economic growth (see, among others, Myrdal 1989; Andvig and Moene
1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1995; La Porta et al. 1999; Li et al. 2000; Gyimah-
Brempong 2002; Tanzi and Davoodi 2002; Blackburn and Sarmah 2008; World Bank
2007, 2011).6
Corruption is harmful for competition, reduces the incentives to invest both domestic-
ally and from abroad, and negatively misallocates public resources affecting the efficiency
of public investments (Mauro 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 2002; Gupta et al. 2001).
Moreover, corruption reduces the level of trust in the institutions and among people
(Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Uslaner 2013) and produces uncertainty, thereby making the
economic transactions more costly and inefficient, and negatively affecting the business en-
vironment (see, among others, Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1995; Blackburn and
Sarmah 2008; Hunt 2006; Hunt and Laszlo 2005). In a highly corrupt environment, cor-
ruption damages especially the small and medium firms because of their limited financial
resources, lower bargaining power, and more informal structure. Those features, indeed,
make it very difficult for them to resist to the payment of bribes, whose burden per output
is greater than for large firms (Svensson 2003; Campos et al. 2010; Gbetnkom 2012; Seker
and Yang 2012; Van Vu et al. 2016; Galli et al. 2017b).
In the literature on the determinants of corruption, gender is also considered a relevant
issue. There is not a unanimous consensus about the link between gender and corruption;
indeed, different perspectives are offered (see, in this regards, Agerberg 2014; Wa¨ngnerud
2014). Part of the literature (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001; Alatas et al. 2009;
Melnykovska and Michailova 2009; Esarey and Chirillo 2013) develops the so-called gen-
der differences perspective and argues that women, being more pro-social and risk-averse,
are less inclined to engage in corrupt practices, perceive general corruption levels as worse,
and are less tolerant towards the phenomenon. Moreover, in highly corrupt environments,
women appear more socially vulnerable compared to men and face lower opportunities of
business (Goetz 2007). According to other studies (Sung 2003, 2012), instead, liberal
democracies favour both higher female participation in the political and economic life of a
country and lower corruption. Therefore, no casual relation between gender and corruption
can be assumed (the so-called liberal democracy perspective). Finally, some papers support
the so-called opportunities perspective arguing that women are less likely to engage in cor-
rupt practices because they still have fewer opportunities compared to men. In other words,
in most countries women earn less money and have fewer responsibilities in public issues,
as well as in business, which make them less likely to be involved in bribery (Alhassan-
Alolo 2007; Bjarnega˚rd 2013).
Additionally, there is a branch of the literature that focuses on the role that social capital
plays in the credit market whose functioning is based, among other things, on credibility
and trust. By increasing the level of trust and reducing the asymmetric information charac-
terizing credit contracts, social capital improves the credit conditions for firms—thereby
easing their access to bank loans (Uzzi 1999; Guiso et al. 2004; Moro and Fink 2013;
Mistrulli and Vacca 2015)—and facilitates the collection of soft information, which in turn
6 On the contrary, another strand of literature argues that corruption conveys the market response
to the inefficiencies of the public sector working as ‘grease’ rather than ‘sand in the wheels’. This
literature empirically predicts a non-linear relation between corruption and economic growth at
low levels of corruption incidence (see, among others, Lui 1985; Klitgaard 1988; Shleifer and Vishny
1993; Acemoglu and Verdier 1998).
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5reduces adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena. Consequently, a higher level of so-
cial capital facilitates the access to bank loans—especially for people and firms, like
women-led ones, that generally use informal channels of finance (see Guiso et al. 2004;
Alesina et al. 2013; Guiso et al. 2013).
2.2 Gender and bank credit access
Several studies have investigated whether the gender of the firm’s manager/owner affects
the access conditions to credit. The empirical evidence is mixed and mostly driven by the
country-context. Part of the literature argues that women’s perception about the difficulties
in access to bank credit explains their lower propensity to apply for external funding
(Coleman 2000; Cole and Mehran 2011). Affecting the risk-taking behaviour, this percep-
tion itself may result in self-restraint attitudes, by women-led firms, from applying for bank
credit (see, inter alia, Robb and Wolken 2002; Babcock and Laschever 2003; Roper and
Scott 2009; Carter et al. 2015; Malmstro¨m et al. 2017). Some studies, instead, attribute the
existence of gender-based differences to the circumstance that women-led firms generally
tend to be of small and medium size, operate in more traditional sectors such as the ser-
vices, and are characterized by lower business management experience, resistance to pro-
vide collateral guarantees, and inclination in utilizing personal funds, retained earnings,
home equity loans, and family loans to finance their businesses (Haines et al. 1999;
Coleman 2000; Treichel and Scott 2006; Coleman and Robb 2009; Moro and Fink 2013;
Cole and Mehran 2011; Sena et al. 2012).
On the supply side, the literature investigates whether women-led firms face lower credit
availability and/or worse cost conditions and provides mixed evidence.7 While some studies
find that women-led enterprises have greater difficulties than man-led ones in obtaining
bank loans (Marlow and Patton 2005; Becker-Blease and Sohl 2007; Muravyev et al. 2009;
Bellucci et al. 2010; Kwong et al. 2012; Wu and Chua 2012; Alsos and Ljunggren 2016;
Mascia and Rossi 2017), others exclude gender discrimination and attribute the differences
in cost conditions to economic and financial factors, such as credit history, assets, sales,
and years in business (Cavalluzzo et al. 2002; Blanchflower et al. 2003). A few papers find
that women-led firms face more unfavourable loan contract terms than male firms, moti-
vated by the fact that the formers are less inclined to grow (Fabowale et al. 1995).
Few papers have specifically addressed the issue of gender in credit markets utilizing
European data. Stefani and Vacca (2015) investigate whether gender affects SMEs’ access
to credit in the four largest European countries—Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. They
find that female firms face more difficulties than their male counterparts in accessing bank
credit mostly because of their characteristics (firm size, age, and sector of activity) rather
than because of gender discrimination. Moro et al. (2017) find that, on the demand side,
women-led firms tend to apply less often than male-led ones, as they seem to be less confi-
dent about the outcome of their applications; on the supply side, banks mostly allocate
loans according to the creditworthiness of the firm and do not seem to be gender-biased.
In this article we focus on the demand side of the European credit market to investigate
whether the quality of the institutional environment differently affects female- and male-led
7 Please mind that the literature has also investigated other aspects of discrimination (such as the
ethnic one) in the access to bank credit. See Alde´n and Hammarstedt (2016) for an extensive re-
view of the literature.
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6firms’ behaviour. Based on the above-mentioned strands of the literature we enquire whether,
in a less corrupt environment, female-led firms show lower discouragement in applying for
bank loans than male-led ones. Therefore our research hypothesis is as follows:
H1: In a less corrupt environment, women-led SMEs face a lower probability to self-refrain
from applying to bank credit compared to men-led peers.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data description
Our main source of data is represented by the SAFE,8 run on behalf of the European
Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) every 6 months (via the so-called
waves) since 2009. It collects microdata about firms’ financial needs, their experience in the
access to finance, as well as a series of financial and other firm-level characteristics through a
survey of companies chartered in Europe and randomly selected from the Dun and Bradstreet
business register.9 Firms in agriculture, public administration, and financial services are inten-
tionally excluded. Moreover, the sample is stratified by country, firm’s size, and activity.
Our analysis is limited to nine waves of the survey (i.e. from the 2nd to the 10th—
corresponding to a period spanning from 1 July 2009 to 31 March 2014) because the key
variable employed for our tests (i.e. the gender) is only available for those rounds. We restrict
our study to the 11 largest Euro-area economies (i.e. Austria, Belgium, France, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain)10—as they are also
the ones for which the related firms’ observations are always available throughout the period
of our investigation. In addition, it is worth noting that these countries, although belonging
to the same currency area, are characterized by heterogeneities in terms of the micro and
macroeconomic features, as well as in regard to the social–institutional environment.
Table 1 shows the distribution of our observations by country, with France, Spain,
Germany, and Italy displaying the highest values.
3.2 Dependent variable
The outcome of the SAFE question q7a_a is employed to create the dependent variable for
our study. Specifically, this question detects whether a firm applied for bank loans, as well
as a series of reasons why it did not. More precisely, the question is:
[With regards to bank loans], could you please indicate whether you: (1) applied for them over
the past 6 months; (2) did not apply because you thought you would be rejected; (3) did not
apply because you had sufficient internal funds; (4) or did not apply for other reasons?
The values from 1 to 4, outlined in parentheses, denote the way each interviewee’s an-
swers were coded. Therefore we employ the qualitative data resulting from such question
to generate our dependent variable that we label as ‘applying for bank loans’.
8 The survey is available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.
html
9 For the countries where the Dun and Bradstreet register was not available, other sources were
used.
10 The smallest countries in the Eurozone (Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Slovakia, and Slovenia) represent less than 3% of the total employment in the area. Therefore we
have decided to exclude them from the sample.
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73.3 Key variables
3.3.1 Gender
The SAFE collects information about the gender of the owner, director, or CEO of the
surveyed firms from the 2nd to the 10th wave (i.e. from 1 July 2009 to 31 March 2014).
We thus employ such information to construct a dummy that represents the key part of
our empirical analysis. Specifically, we create ‘Female’ as a dichotomous variable equal
to 1 if the owner/director/CEO of the firm is female and 0 if it is male. Figure 1 shows
Table 1. Observations by country
Country name Frequency %
Austria 3,800 6.33
Belgium 3,642 6.06
Finland 3,643 6.07
France 8,921 14.85
Germany 8,670 14.44
Greece 3,849 6.41
Ireland 3,382 5.63
Italy 8,043 13.39
The Netherlands 3,670 6.11
Portugal 3,734 6.22
Spain 8,704 14.49
Total 60,058 100.00
Figure 1. Percentage of female firms by country.
AT ¼ Austria, BE ¼ Belgium, DE ¼ Germany, ES ¼ Spain, FI ¼ Finland, FR ¼ France, GR ¼ Greece, IE ¼
Ireland, IT ¼ Italy, NL ¼ The Netherlands, PT ¼ Portugal.
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8the percentage of female firms, in our sample, by country. Interestingly, we note that The
Netherlands is the country with the lowest share of female firms (about 9.8%) in the
sample. On the other hand, Germany and Portugal present the highest shares of female
enterprises—about 14 and 14.6%, respectively. On average, female businesses cover
about 12.5% of the sample. Such very modest figure—namely, the low percentage of
female-led companies throughout our sample—may be due to the difficulties faced by
women in reaching top managerial positions (Bush 2011; Grosvold 2011; Moro et al.
2017).
3.3.2 Corruption
Corruption erodes economic freedom by introducing insecurity and uncertainty into eco-
nomic relationships. In the literature, two major alternative approaches to measuring cor-
ruption are developed: subjective indicators, based on survey data about corruption
perceptions and/or experiences, and objective measures, such as the number of corruption-
related trials or economic proxies. While the latter are appropriate for single-country ana-
lyses, the differences in the national judicial systems justify the use of the formers in case of
cross-country studies (as it is our case).
Therefore, for the scope of our investigation, two measures of corruption are alterna-
tively utilized: ‘Freedom from Corruption’ provided by the Heritage Foundation—whose
score is primarily derived from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI)—and ‘Control of Corruption’ drawn from the ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’,
available at the World Bank. For both variables, low values of the measure denote high cor-
ruption, whereas high values indicate low corruption. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the de-
gree of corruption by country according to the two indicators, respectively. Here we
observe that Greece and Italy are the most corrupt economies, as they present the lowest
 
Figure 2. Freedom from corruption by country.
AT ¼ Austria, BE ¼ Belgium, DE ¼ Germany, ES ¼ Spain, FI ¼ Finland, FR ¼ France, GR ¼ Greece, IE ¼
Ireland, IT ¼ Italy, NL ¼ The Netherlands, PT ¼ Portugal.
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9values of the index. In contrast, Finland and The Netherlands, with the highest values, are
the least corrupt countries in our sample.
3.4 Econometric methodology and control variables
To carry out our analyses, we employ multinomial logistic models.11 Such choice
moves from the possibility (i) to employ a discrete dependent variable that takes more
than two outcomes (that have no natural ordering), and (ii) to use both continuous as
well as dichotomous variables as regressors (see, for instance, Gregory et al. 2005).
Regressions include time and country dummies or, alternatively, country*time dummies.
Furthermore, we adjust the sample to be representative of the population from which it
is extracted by employing calibrated weights (as in Ferrando et al. 2017). Finally,
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are utilized to remove possible bias in the
estimations.
As outlined in H1, our analysis is aimed at investigating whether the different degree of
corruption characterizing the countries of our sample plays a role in a female firm’s deci-
sion not to apply for bank loans. However, before doing so, we decide to carry out two pre-
liminary steps.
3.4.1 Exploring the existence of a causal relation
Indeed, we first need to check whether women are more or less inclined than men in not-
applying for bank loans and whether the level of corruption, at the country level, is
Figure 3. Control of corruption by country.
AT ¼ Austria, BE ¼ Belgium, DE ¼ Germany, ES ¼ Spain, FI ¼ Finland, FR ¼ France, GR ¼ Greece, IE ¼
Ireland, IT ¼ Italy, NL ¼ The Netherlands, PT ¼ Portugal.
11 Multinomial logistic models are not uncommon in a variety of strands of the literature in business.
See, for instance, Badoer and James (2016), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013), Ongena and S¸endeniz-
Yu¨ncu¨ (2011), Sieva¨nen et al. (2017).
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significantly correlated to the non-application reasons. To do so, we thus estimate the fol-
lowing model:
Piðapplying for bank loansÞ ¼ f ðFemale; corruption; country controls; firm characteristicsÞ
(1)
where we expect our ‘Female’ dummy to exhibit a positive sign, thus signalling a higher
propensity by female-led businesses not to applying for fear of rejection and for other rea-
sons. As specified earlier in Section 3.3.2, ‘corruption’ alternatively includes ‘Freedom from
Corruption’ or ‘Control of Corruption’ indicators. ‘Firm characteristics’ is a vector contain-
ing standard controls (i.e. firm’s size, and age), some firm’s financial characteristics (i.e. the
change in profitability and in credit history), as well as variations in the enterprise’s credit
needs. The use of such controls, together with the dummies accounting for the country and
the time effects, should reduce possible endogeneity problems arising from the data. More
precisely, the standard controls are likely to reduce the potential cause of endogeneity by
capturing the independent impact of firm-level heterogeneity related to size and age. In
other words, including such variables in our models allows us to alleviate potential worries
that the possible variations observed in the probability to not applying for bank loans are
driven from the firm-specific characteristics rather than from the existence of gender dispar-
ities. The financial firm controls accounting for the change in profitability, in creditworthi-
ness and in the firm’s demand for credit, in the past 6 months, are also meant to reduce the
effect of potential sources of bias that could affect our models. Notably, the change in profit
is aimed at capturing variations of the firm profitability. We expect that the firms that im-
proved their income statements in the previous 6 months are less likely not to applying for
bank credit for fear of rejection; conversely, firms that worsened their profitability are
more likely to be discouraged from applying. We capture the change in profit by generating
the following two dummies: profit up (equal to 1 if a firm declares that the profit has
increased over the past 6 months) and profit down (equal to 1 if a firm declares that the
profit has decreased over the past 6 months). Furthermore, we control for the credit history
of the enterprises in our sample. Specifically, we would expect that firms that improved
(worsened) their creditworthiness over time might be less (more) likely to refrain from
applying for bank loans. Following the procedure described above, we build two dummies
accounting for the change in the firms’ credit history: creditworthiness up (equal to 1 if the
firms declare that the creditworthiness has increased over the past 6 months) and credit-
worthiness down (equal to 1 if the firms declare that the creditworthiness has decreased
over the past 6 months). In addition, we control for the variations in the firm’s need for
credit by including two additional dummies. Namely, we generate: demand up (equal to 1
if a firm declares an increase in the need for bank loans over the past 6 months) and de-
mand down (equal to 1 if a firm declares a decrease in the need for bank loans over the past
6 months). Please mind that all these dummies are not capturing the level of demand for
bank loans, profitability, and creditworthiness. Rather, they offer a picture of the perceived
change of each of them from the interviewee’s perspective. Finally, the ‘country controls’ in-
clude a wide set of variables controlling for the country features. First of all, we include the
biannual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate—that we compute as averages of quar-
terly data drawn from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)—to account for the general economic conditions. Moreover, our regressions in-
clude ‘Trade Freedom’, which is a variable drawn from the Heritage Foundation, to
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account for the absence of regulatory barriers to trade. We expect that firms chartered in
countries characterized by a higher trade freedom are less inclined in refraining from apply-
ing for bank loans. A variable accounting for the quality of contract enforcement and prop-
erty rights, drawn from the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World
Bank, is also included and labelled as ‘Rule of Law’. The idea is that where the confidence
in the rules of society is higher, the enterprises are less likely to be discouraged from apply-
ing for fear of being credit constrained and to resort to alternative channels. Our specifica-
tions also include a control that proxies for the level of reliance of the private sector
towards the banking industry. Specifically, we include ‘Domestic credit to private sector by
banks’, which is computed as percentage of GDP and drawn from the World Bank. The
Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI),12 drawn from the World Economic Forum, is also
added to our models as a proxy for social capital. We thus expect that the higher the index,
the lower the probability that a firm may be discouraged from applying for fear of being
credit constrained or to resort to alternative channels of finance. Finally, we include the
Herfindahl Index (HI) of bank total assets concentration to account for the competition in
the banking industry. The idea is that, when the bank concentration is higher because of
the lower banking competition, firms are more likely to behave as discouraged as they an-
ticipate a possible rejection.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables employed in our analysis.
Table A1 in the Appendix, instead, provides variables’ description and sources.
3.4.2 Addressing endogeneity
Endogeneity may be a source of concern in our analysis. Indeed, the firm’s leadership gen-
der may not be completely exogenous. Either reverse causality—the level of credit rationing
may impact on the firm performance and, thus, on the choice of the leader to be hired—or
omitted variables—namely, unobservable organizational and managerial skills, or a given
corporate culture may push towards a given leader rather than another—can affect our esti-
mates (see, inter alia, Adams and Ferreira 2009; Liu et al. 2014; Sila et al. 2016; Mascia
and Rossi 2017). If this is the case, we cannot argue that our results are showing the exist-
ence of a causal relation between the leader’s gender and the probability of non-application
to bank credit.
To face such potential issue, similarly to Cumming (2008) and Heger and Tykvova´
(2009), we utilize a two-step approach. This technique requires us to employ a logit model
to study the determinants of our Female dummy, in the first stage. Notably, for identifica-
tion purposes, we need an instrument that is highly correlated with the Female dummy and
is not correlated with the error term. A good candidate, in this regard, can be the share of
female employment by sector of activity available at Eurostat (see, for instance, Mascia and
Rossi 2017). Therefore, we regress Female on the rate of female employment and a variety
of firm and country controls from Model (1). Afterwards, in the second and final step, we
estimate Model (1) by employing our multinomial logistic setting where, in lieu of the
Female dummy, we include the predicted values obtained from the first step.
12 Low values of the GGGI underline higher gender disparities, whereas high values of the same
index underscore higher gender equality.
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3.4.3 Assessing whether corruption influences women-led firms’ decision not to apply
Once carried out the previous steps, if a causal effect between the leader’s gender and the
non-application for bank loans has been detected, then we are finally legitimized to test our
research hypothesis.
To do so, we decide to utilize interaction models. Namely, we take Model (1) and add
an interaction term between our Female dummy and one of the alternative proxies for cor-
ruption, thus to check whether different degrees of corruption at the country-level may in-
fluence women’s discouragement in applying for bank loans. More specifically, to avoid
multicollinearity between the interaction term and its constituent variables, we mean centre
the corruption measures before including them in our models. By mean centring, we basic-
ally transform the original corruption measures into deviations from their mean (Vallascas
and Hagendorff 2013).
Our expectation is that, in a better environment (i.e. where corruption is lower), female
firms are more confident about the success of their applications and tend to refrain less—
than it would happen in a more corrupt environment—from applying for bank loans.
Alternatively, we may find that women’s discouragement is independent of the surrounding
Table 2. Summary statistics
Observations Mean Median Standard
deviation
p1 p99
Dependent variable
Applying for bank loans 60,058 2.625 3.000 1.085 1.000 4.000
Key variable
Female 60,058 0.125 0.000 0.331 0.000 1.000
Corruption
Freedom from corruption 60,058 67.556 69.000 15.783 34.000 94.000
Control of corruption 60,058 1.197 1.420 0.713 0.250 2.220
Country-level controls
GDP growth rate 60,058 0.188 0.300 2.675 8.200 5.050
Trade freedom 60,058 86.037 87.100 2.160 80.800 87.600
Rule of law 60,058 1.282 1.430 0.506 0.360 1.970
Domestic credit by banks 60,058 133.621 116.834 38.873 89.313 207.619
GGGI 60,058 0.733 0.733 0.042 0.672 0.845
Concentration 60,058 0.091 0.060 0.079 0.021 0.370
Firm-level (SAFE) controls
Demand up 60,058 0.190 0.000 0.392 0.000 1.000
Demand down 60,058 0.135 0.000 0.341 0.000 1.000
Profit up 60,058 0.246 0.000 0.431 0.000 1.000
Profit down 60,058 0.466 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000
Creditworthiness up 60,058 0.213 0.000 0.409 0.000 1.000
Creditworthiness down 60,058 0.141 0.000 0.348 0.000 1.000
Micro 60,058 0.336 0.000 0.472 0.000 1.000
Small 60,058 0.337 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000
Medium 60,058 0.254 0.000 0.436 0.000 1.000
Very recent 60,058 0.017 0.000 0.127 0.000 1.000
Recent 60,058 0.066 0.000 0.248 0.000 1.000
Old 60,058 0.126 0.000 0.332 0.000 1.000
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environment and female leaders tend to self-refrain, more than male ones, just because of
their intrinsic attitude in being less confident about their entrepreneurial capabilities as well
as in being more risk-averse (Booth and Nolen 2015; Caliendo et al. 2015; Carter et al.
2015; Crosetto et al. 2015).
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Baseline specifications
We now discuss the results of the multinomial logistic model presented in Section 3.4.1. As
specified earlier, the use of such methodology is ideal when the dependent variable takes
more than two qualitative outcomes with no natural ordering. Additionally, when employ-
ing such a method, we need to specify a base outcome against which comparing the remain-
ing outcomes of the dependent variable. For this reason, we decide to compare the motives
that lead firms not to apply for bank loans (i.e. non-application ‘for fear of rejection’, ‘for
sufficient funds’, ‘for other reasons’) against the base outcome ‘applied’. Table 3 shows the
results of three different specifications of Model (1) that we carried out utilizing ‘Freedom
from corruption’ or ‘Control of corruption’ as alternative proxies for corruption, in Panel
A and Panel B, respectively. Starting from the left-hand side of the Table (both Panels), the
first test is carried out on a baseline specification that does not include any country-level
control apart from the corruption measure. The specification that appears in the centre of
the Table, instead, adds all the country-level controls (i.e. GDP growth, Trade freedom,
Rule of Low, Domestic credit to private sector by banks over GDP, the GGGI, and the HI
of bank concentration) to the previous specification. Finally, in the last Columns of the
Table, we report a robustness test where, in lieu of the country-level variables, we insert
country*time dummies.
Starting from Panel A of Table 3, estimates highlight that the dummy Female always
presents a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that women-led businesses are
more likely than their male counterparts to self-refrain from applying for bank loans due to
fear of rejection, to availability of sufficient internal funds, and for other reasons (as they
probably prefer to relying on family or friends networks). It is also worthy of note that the
marginal effects reported in brackets underscore that women-led businesses appear to be
6.3% more likely than men-led ones to self-refrain from applying to bank credit for fear of
rejection. Our results seem to be strongly significant whether we do not employ country-
level controls (first specification), or when we include them (second specification), as well
as when—to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by the choice of the country
controls included—we check the robustness of our findings by dropping the country-level
variables and employing country*time effects (third specification).
As regards the corruption measure, the variable ‘Freedom from corruption’ turns to be
significantly and negatively correlated to our dependent variable almost in all specifica-
tions, especially with regard to the non-application for fear of rejection. Indeed, this result
is stable across the various specifications presented in Table 3. In other words, this finding
seems to highlight that in countries characterized by a lower degree of corruption (i.e.
higher freedom from corruption), SMEs appear to be more confident about the success of
their loan applications and, therefore, they are less likely to self-refrain from applying to
bank credit for fear of rejection.
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As for the other controls included in the various specifications, it is worth mentioning
that, consistently with our expectations, the dummies ‘Profit down’ and ‘Credit down’ ex-
hibit positive coefficients in Columns 2, 6, and 10, signalling that firms that have decreased
their profit and creditworthiness in the past 6 months are more likely to self-refrain from
applying as they anticipate a rejection from the lender. In contrast, firms that experienced
an improvement of the credit history—as proxied by the dummy ‘Creditworthiness up’—
are generally less likely to refrain from applying for credit.
If we then focus on the specification outlined in the centre of the Table, some interesting
insights also emerge from the coefficients related to the country-level controls. Indeed, here
we find that firms chartered in countries with greater confidence in the rules of society (as
proxied by ‘Rule of law’) and higher trade freedom are less likely to refrain from applying
for bank loans for fear of rejection. As regards the bank concentration, in contrast to our
expectations, this variable exhibits a negative and significant coefficient in Column 6,
meaning that, when the bank competition is lower, firms do not appear to anticipate a re-
jection from the lender and, as such, do not seem to be discouraged from applying for
credit. This may be explained by the so-called information hypothesis, which argues that,
in more concentrated markets, banks have higher incentives to create durable businesses
with their borrowers—thus eventually increasing the firms’ confidence towards the banking
system (see, for instance, Funga´cova´ et al. 2017).
Moving to Panel B, here we observe that the previous findings are confirmed even when
we employ ‘Control of corruption’ as an alternative proxy for the degree of corruption
characterizing the environment. Specifically, the Female dummy enters all the specifications
with a positive and significant sign, thus confirming the higher likelihood of women-led en-
terprises, compared to men, to not applying for credit for the variety of reasons investi-
gated. As for the corruption indicator, we almost find that its coefficient is negatively
correlated to the probability of not applying for fear of rejection (see Columns 2, 6, and
10)—which confirms that when corruption is lower firms tend to be less discouraged from
applying for credit. Finally, as for the country-level controls, it is worth mentioning that in
Column 6, the GGGI enters with a negative and significant sign, suggesting that when the
perceived gender disparities are lower (i.e. a country’s social capital is higher), firms seem
to be more confident towards the banking system and, as such, are less inclined in not
applying to bank credit for fear of rejection.
Overall, our findings show that women-led enterprises tend to self-refrain, more than
men, from applying for credit. Additionally, results seem to highlight that a higher-quality
institutional environment—as measured in terms of lower corruption—helps firms to gain
confidence about their abilities in being successful in case of a loan application is filed, thus
reducing their potential discouragement. For this reason—after addressing (in the next
Section) potential endogeneity problems affecting our estimates—in the subsequent Section
we decide to further explore this issue and test whether, eventually, the external environ-
ment actually influences the behaviour of female-led firms with regard to their inclination
in applying for bank loans.
4.2 Addressing endogeneity
As anticipated in Section 3.4.2, endogeneity may be a source of concern in our investigation.
To address this issue we employ a two-step approach in a similar fashion to Cumming (2008)
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and Heger and Tykvova´ (2009). More specifically, such an approach requires us to first iden-
tify an instrument for our Female dummy. In this regard, the share of female employment by
sector of activity appears to be a good candidate for our purpose. However, because some of
the observations within the SAFE refer to firms that are not classified within any sector of ac-
tivity, when implementing such methodology we face a minor drop of observations that leads
us to a sample of 57,885 rows.
Table 4 reports the results of the final stage of our two-step approach, where we esti-
mate Model (1) through the use of a multinomial logistic model that—rather than utilizing
the original Female dummy—employs the predicted value of Female that we acquire from
the first step logistic estimation.13 As we did in the previous Table, we report the tests car-
ried out utilizing three specifications of Model (1)—namely, without country-level controls
(left-hand side of the Table), with the inclusion of all the country variables (centre of the
Table) and, as a robustness check, with the use of country*time dummies in lieu of the
country controls (right-hand side of the Table). Finally, the various specifications reported
in Panel A differ from those in Panel B for the different indicator of corruption utilized—
‘Freedom from corruption’ versus ‘Control of corruption’, respectively.
Results from both Panels of the Table show that, even after addressing the endogeneity
concerns, Female enters all the specifications with a significant and positive coefficient,
indicating that women-led businesses are more likely than men-led ones to avoid loan appli-
cations either for fear of rejection, or for sufficient internal funds, as well as for other rea-
sons, as compared to the base outcome ‘applied’. Such a result does not appear to be driven
by the choice of including, or not, the country-level controls, and is also robust to the use of
country*time fixed effects.
Overall, even after modifying our regressions to overcome the possible endogeneity issue
affecting our estimates, results confirm the existence of a self-restraint attitude, by women-
led enterprises, in demanding credit. Additionally, the negative sign associated to the coeffi-
cient of the corruption indicators seems to corroborate the view according to which the bet-
ter the external environment, the lower the probability that a firm is discouraged from
applying for fear of being credit constrained.
All in all, having ascertained that the leadership gender actually matters in the firm’s
propensity not to apply for bank loans, we have finally laid the groundwork to test our
main research question. Namely, we are now legitimized to assess whether a better external
environment surrounding the firm may possibly help female leaders in reducing their dis-
couragement when they have to deal with credit institutions.
4.3 Assessing whether corruption affects women-led firms’ decisions
As described in Section 3.4.3, to check whether the institutional environment might influ-
ence women’s propensity in not applying for bank credit, we add—to Model (1)—an inter-
action term between our Female dummy and one of the alternative proxies for corruption.
Specifically, in Table 5 we present the results in a similar fashion to what we did in the pre-
vious Tables. Namely, we start without including any country-level control apart from the
corruption measure (left-hand side of the Table), then we add all the country variables
13 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimates of the first logistic step, where we find that
the instrument has a highly significant positive impact (at the 1% level) on the probability of female
leadership.
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(centre of the Table), and finally we check the robustness of our tests by substituting the
country controls with the country*time dummies (right-hand side of the Table). Moreover,
Panel A and Panel B only differ for the type of corruption indicator utilized (i.e. ‘Freedom
from corruption’ versus ‘Control of corruption’, respectively). In addition, please remind
that both corruption measures are mean-centred to avoid multicollinearity between the
interaction term and its constituent variables. All in all, if H1 is corroborated, we should
find a significant coefficient for the interaction term, thus signalling that corruption eventu-
ally represents an obstacle for the access to bank credit by women.
Table 5 displays the results of our empirical analysis. While we observe that the Female
dummy always remains positive and highly statistically significant and we note that the cor-
ruption measures are negatively correlated to our dependent variable, interestingly—and in
contrast to our expectations—the interaction term does not turn to be significant in any of
the specifications reported in the Table. This result seems to suggest that women-led SMEs
are more likely than men-led ones not to applying for credit regardless of the level of cor-
ruption characterizing the country where the firm is chartered. Notably, the evidence
emerging from our analysis seems also to reveal that women’s discouragement in applying
to bank credit for fear of rejection is mostly driven by the intrinsic attitude of women in
being less confident about their abilities in dealing with banks (Carter et al. 2015), rather
than by the country’s level of corruption. This is particularly unfortunate because, even
when the institutional environment does not seem to obstacle firms (as it should be when
corruption is low), in holding such a conduct female enterprises preclude themselves the
possibility to expand and let their businesses grow. Ideally, female owners/managers should
gain more confidence about their bargaining abilities with banks thus to refrain less from
applying for credit and eventually being even more successful with their businesses.
Some additional tests have been performed to assess the robustness of our findings. First
of all, to rule out the possibility that the vector of country and time dummies that we
included in our specifications might generate collinearity with the country-level controls,
we have re-run our regressions by excluding such dummies. Additionally, as a further
check, we have re-estimated the various specifications of Model (1) by including industry
effects (i.e. the dummies accounting for the firms’ sector of activity). In both cases,
results—that we do not report for the sake of brevity—confirm our findings.
5. Conclusions
Accessing formal channels of credit, such as the bank lending one, is pivotal for the success-
ful management of SMEs, given their inability to entry equity markets. In addition, the ex-
ternal environment surrounding the enterprises—in terms of quality of the institutions and
social capital—may also play a role in the firms’ attitude towards bank credit, thus impact-
ing on their possibility to grow. Notably, we think that corruption may negatively modify
firms’ expectations about the propensity of banks to finance their projects, thus affecting
the level of trust characterizing the bank–firm relationship. These issues are of particular
concern for the enterprises led by women because they may perceive corruption as an obs-
tacle, more than men do, and consequently feel less confident in managing their businesses.
This article is thus an attempt to address the question of whether the perceived level of
corruption in a country influences women’s inclination in self-refraining from applying for
bank loans for a variety of motives (i.e. fear of rejection, sufficient funds, other reasons).
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To this end we utilize a sample of 60,058 observations—drawn from the ECB-SAFE—
related to SMEs chartered in 11 Euro-area countries during the period 2009–2014.
Overall, our findings—robust to different model specifications—show that (i) women-
led enterprises seem to self-refrain, more than men, from applying for bank loans, and this
result still holds even after addressing potential endogeneity problems affecting our esti-
mates; (ii) the quality of the institutional environment—as proxied by corruption—is sig-
nificantly correlated to the probability that SMEs do not apply for bank credit (i.e. the
better the environment, the lower the probability of non-application); (iii) the self-restraint
attitudes of women-led businesses towards bank credit do not appear to be influenced by
the surrounding environment (i.e. although chartered in an ideally better environment,
female-led SMEs keep refraining from applying for fear of rejection and other reasons). In
other words, our empirical analysis highlights that women-led firms generally tend to re-
frain from applying for loans, more than men, regardless of the level of corruption in a
country. This result confirms theories emphasizing the greater risk-aversion generally char-
acterizing women’s behaviour.
Our results suggest that measures addressing women-led businesses may be crucial in
helping female leaders in gaining more confidence about their entrepreneurial capabilities
and their bargaining abilities with banks, thus to refrain less from applying for credit and
eventually ensuring the possibility to grow and being even more successful with their busi-
nesses. Moreover, our findings indicate that anti-corruption policies and measures aimed to
enhance transparency and reduce information asymmetry in the economy may play a rele-
vant role in reducing the negative spillovers generated by a low-quality institutional envir-
onment on SMEs access to bank credit.
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Appendix
Table A1. Variable descriptions and sources
Variables Description Source
Dependent variable
Applying for bank
loans
Variable that equals one/two/three/four if
(considering the bank loans) a firm
applied/did not apply because of possible
rejection/did not apply because of suffi-
cient internal funds/did not apply for
other reasons during the past 6 months,
respectively
ECB: SAFE
Key variable
Female Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s
owner/director/CEO is female, and 0
otherwise
ECB: SAFE
Corruption
Freedom from
corruption
The higher the level of corruption, the lower
the level of overall economic freedom and
the lower a country’s score
Heritage Foundation
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Table A1. (continued)
Variables Description Source
Control of
corruption
The higher the level of corruption, the lower
a country’s score
Worldwide
Governance
Indicators
Country-level controls
GDP growth The annual growth rate of real GDP based
on averages of quarterly data for each sur-
vey round
OECD
Trade freedom A measure of a country’s trade freedom Heritage Foundation
Rule of law An indicator that reflects the perceptions
about the quality of contract enforcement
and property rights
Worldwide
Governance
Indicators
Domestic credit by
banks
The share of domestic credit provided to the
private sector by banks, as percentage of
GDP
World Bank
GGGI An index designed to measure a country’s
gender equality.
World Economic
Forum
Concentration The HI of total assets concentration (for the
banking sector)
ECB: Data
Warehouse
Firm-level (SAFE) controls
Demand up Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s
needs of bank loan increased in the past 6
months
ECB: SAFE
Demand down Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s
needs of bank loan decreased in the past 6
months
ECB: SAFE
Profit up Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm expe-
rienced an increase of the net income after
taxes in the past 6 months
ECB: SAFE
Profit down Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm expe-
rienced a decrease of the net income after
taxes in the past 6 months
ECB: SAFE
Creditworthiness
up
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s
credit history improved in the past 6
months
ECB: SAFE
Creditworthiness
down
Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s
credit history worsened in the past 6
months
ECB: SAFE
Micro Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has
between 1 and 9 employees
ECB: SAFE
Small Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has
between 10 and 49 employees
ECB: SAFE
Medium Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has
between 50 and 249 employees
ECB: SAFE
Very recent Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is
less than 2 years old
ECB: SAFE
Recent Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is
between 2 and 5 years old
ECB: SAFE
Old Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is
between 5 and 10 years old
ECB: SAFE
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